Senate bill 3580 76th Congress : Statement by The American Institute of Accountants before Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency by American Institute of Accountants
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams American Institute of Certified Public Accountants(AICPA) Historical Collection
1-1-1940
Senate bill 3580 76th Congress : Statement by The
American Institute of Accountants before
Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency
American Institute of Accountants;United States. Congress. Senate. Banking and Currency Committee
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection at
eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
American Institute of Accountants;United States. Congress. Senate. Banking and Currency Committee, "Senate bill 3580 76th
Congress : Statement by The American Institute of Accountants before Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency"
(1940). Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams. 311.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc/311
SENATE BILL 3580 
76th Congress 
Statement by 
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE 
OF ACCOUNTANTS 
Before 
Subcommittee, Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency 
STATEMENT ON SENATE BILL 3 5 8 0 IN THE 76TH 
CONGRESS TO PROVIDE FOR THE REGISTRATION 
AND REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES 
AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
Statement by American Institute of Accountants 
This statement, which deals only with Section 32 (c) (1) 
of Senate Bill 3580, has been prepared by a special committee 
of the American Institute of Accountants. The chairman of 
this special committee is the president of the Institute, and its 
members include a vice president, two members of the execu-
tive committee, the chairman of the special committee on 
coöperation with Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
a member of the committee on auditing procedure. 
The American Institute of Accountants is the national pro-
fessional organization of certified public accountants in the 
United States, with a membership of 5,316, including the great 
majority of those who act as auditors for companies registered 
with the S.E.C. The Institute's activities are similar to those 
of other professional organizations, including the maintenance 
and enforcement of rules of professional conduct, preparation 
of professional examinations, publication of technical and pro-
fessional material, maintenance of an accounting library and 
a research department, etc. The Institute has coöperated in 
various ways with many governmental and private bodies, in-
cluding the Securities and Exchange Commission, which 
consulted the Institute in the development of accounting rules 
and regulations under the Securities Act and the Securities 
Exchange Act. These matters are mentioned in order to 
inform the committee who we are, and to indicate that we are 
generally familiar with the type of problems with which 
Senate Bill 3580 deals. 
A good many sections of the bill relate to accounting and 
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auditing. While we are, naturally, keenly interested in the 
bill as a whole, we believe it proper to restrict our recommenda-
tions to one provision of the bill, directly affecting professional 
certified public accountants as such, which we consider impor-
tant enough to justify this appearance before your committee. 
It Is Recommended that Section 3 2 ( c ) ( 1 ) of the 
Bill Be Deleted 
We earnestly recommend that Section 32 (c) (1) of Senate 
Bill 3580 be deleted. This section provides that: 
"The Commission is authorized, by rules and regulations 
or order in the public interest or for the protection of investors— 
(1) to prescribe the minimum scope of and procedures 
to be followed in any audit of a registered investment 
company;" 
We object to this provision on the ground that it would 
permit assumption by a governmental administrative agency 
of a responsibility which should be assumed by professional 
practitioners; i.e., determination of how extensive an investiga-
tion an independent auditor should make, and the manner in 
which he should make it, before signing his name to his own 
professional opinion regarding the financial position and the 
results of operations of the company under audit. 
It is submitted that 
(1) Such a responsibility could not be successfully assumed 
by a governmental administrative agency; 
(2) An attempt to fix minimum standards would tend to 
lower rather than to raise the standards of auditing practice; 
(3) It would be a new departure in federal legislation to 
provide for supervision by government agents of the details of 
the work of professional practitioners; 
(4) It would be an unwarranted and unnecessary invasion 
of a field of professional practice. 
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Scope of Audit Is a Matter of Sound Judgment, Dif-
fering in Each Case, and Cannot Satisfactorily Be 
Prescribed by Regulations 
It may clarify our suggestion to interpolate at this point a 
brief statement of the status of the certified public accountant 
and the nature of his work. There are, at present, more than 
19,000 certified public accountants in the United States. The 
certificate of certified public accountant is issued by state 
administrative boards, created by law, to candidates who have 
met prescribed educational and experience requirements and 
have passed written examinations in auditing, commercial law, 
accounting theory and practice and, in some cases, other sub-
jects. Certificates may be revoked for malpractice or unpro-
fessional conduct. 
The certified public accountant in professional public 
practice is an independent practitioner. He is not employed 
on a salary basis by the concerns which he audits but is retained 
by them as clients, on a fee basis. His position is different from 
that of the bookkeeper, internal auditor or controller perma-
nently employed by a corporation. The position of the inde-
pendent certified public accountant is comparable with that of 
the practising attorney, engineer, or physician performing 
services in particular cases for clients or patients who do not 
direct the professional man as to methods but look to him for 
results. 
The rapid development of the profession of the certified 
public accountant is largely a result of the public demand for 
a disinterested, independent review and check by competent 
technicians of the accounting records and the accounting judg-
ment of the management of corporate enterprises which make 
use of the savings of the public. The certified public accoun-
tant recognizes a heavy responsibility to all interested parties, 
including stockholders, potential investors, and creditors, who 
may be influenced by his professional opinion regarding the 
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financial position and the results of operations of the company 
concerned, as expressed in his report or certificate as a result 
of his audit. 
An audit is not a simple mechanical process. It is a highly 
technical and complex procedure of examining or testing 
accounting records and the evidence which supports them. 
Some book entries may be confirmed by inspection of cash, 
securities or other physical assets. Underlying evidence which 
may be called for to support other entries in the accounts may 
consist of such varying items as written confirmations of 
accounts with debtors or creditors, directors' minutes, contracts, 
vouchers, invoices, canceled checks, etc. 
It is the duty of the auditor to satisfy himself that the 
accounts and the financial statements based on them fairly 
present the situation. He must use his own judgment as to 
the extent to which it is necessary to check individual records 
of transactions, and the manner in which they shall be checked, 
in order so to satisfy himself. Various factors—for example, 
the efficiency of the internal accounting or internal auditing 
of the company—may have a bearing on his judgment of the 
extent and nature of the examination which he must make in 
each individual case. 
No two cases are exactly alike. Frequently the auditor 
finds it necessary to go further in some respects than is usual, 
and perhaps, in other respects, due to favorable factors, he may 
decide that it is unnecessary to do as much work as might be 
customary. He is responsible morally and legally for the 
opinion expressed in his report or certificate. He must decide 
for himself the amount and nature of the work he must do in 
order to justify the expression of his opinion. 
If auditing were a simple mechanical process, the profes-
sion of the certified public accountant would not have devel-
oped so rapidly in numbers and in prestige. It is the need for 
skilled judgment, based on technical training and experience, 
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which has brought into existence the thousands of certified 
public accountants who are practising in this country today. 
The minimum scope of and procedures to be followed in 
an audit cannot satisfactorily be laid down by rules and regu-
lations as is provided in Section 32 (c) (1) of the bill. The 
auditor must use his judgment and discretion in determining 
the scope of the audit and the methods of procedure just as 
much as in formulating his final opinion on the balance-sheet 
and income statement which are the subject of his report. 
The Government Should Not Assume the Responsi-
bility Inherent in Section 3 2 ( c ) ( 1 ) 
No government agency nor any other body could set up 
practicable rules or regulations prescribing the scope (extent) 
of audit and the procedure (how to do it) to be followed by 
auditors in all cases. If that were possible auditing would be 
a routine procedure which could be left to clerks. No one can 
foresee the circumstances which the auditor will encounter in 
an individual case. The American Institute of Accountants has 
had considerable experience with this problem. It published 
in 1917, at the request of the Federal Trade Commission, an 
outline of points to be covered in typical examinations, under 
the title, "Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance-
Sheet Statements," which was later approved by the Federal 
Reserve Board. This outline was revised in 1929, under the 
title "Verification of Financial Statements" and again in 1936, 
under the title "Examination of Financial Statements by Inde-
pendent Public Accountants." The several revisions indicate 
growth and progress, as well as the impossibility of rigid 
standardization. It has been necessary in each bulletin to 
make clear that in individual cases an auditor may be justified 
in departing and may find it necessary to depart from these 
outlines, and may frequently find it necessary to go further 
than the outline suggests. 
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It has been frequently announced that the policy of the 
Congress in enacting the Securities Act was only to provide 
for full disclosure of material facts in the affairs of a company 
offering its securities for sale, in order that the prospective 
investor might have a fair basis for a decision as to whether 
or not to purchase the securities. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission requires that every prospectus issued under the 
1933 Act bear the words, "These Securities have not been 
approved or disapproved by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission" and "It is a criminal offense to represent that the 
Commission has approved these securities or has made any 
finding that the statements in this prospectus or in the registra-
tion statement are correct." In other words, the Government 
says it takes no responsibility for the results of the investor's 
decision. It seems to us that there is an analogy between this 
problem and the problem raised by Section 32 (c) (1) of the 
Senate Bill 3580. 
If a government agency prescribed "the minimum scope 
of and procedures to be followed in any audit of" an invest-
ment company it could hardly escape responsibility for the 
results of an audit conducted in compliance with that pre-
scription. It is possible that a competent auditor might comply 
exactly with rules of the Commission regarding minimum 
scope of audit and procedures to be followed, and yet fail to 
discover material facts of the utmost importance to investors. 
In such an event would the auditor be relieved of blame 
because he had meticulously followed the instructions of a 
government agency? Probably not, but the government 
agency could hardly escape a share of the blame in the minds 
of the investors whose interests had been adversely affected. 
It is an ancient principle of law that a person whose con-
duct may be controlled and directed as to details of procedure 
is an employee, or servant, as distinguished from an indepen-
dent contractor who may choose his own methods and who is 
held only for results. It is equally well established that there 
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is a definite liability for acts of an employee performed in the 
course of his employment. If the Commission were to prescribe 
the procedures to be followed by accountants in their audits, 
the independence of their relationship would be seriously im-
paired, and if they were to be treated like employees or servants 
the Commission could not escape a share of moral responsibility 
for any harm that might result from their acts. 
It seems to us not in the interests of the Government itself 
to assume a share of a responsibility which is rightfully a 
private responsibility, resting on the shoulders of a professional 
practitioner. 
The Danger of Lowered Auditing Standards 
Prescription of a minimum scope of audit would not, on 
the face of it, prevent an auditor from undertaking additional 
steps beyond the required minimum; but experience shows 
that there is a tendency for minimum requirements to become, 
in fact, maximum requirements. It would be difficult for an 
auditor to persuade a client to agree to an examination more 
extensive than that required by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. We believe that such a condition might result 
in a lowering of the standards of auditing practice and might 
dull the sense of personal responsibility which is now keenly 
felt by the independent certified public accountant. 
Section 3 2 ( c ) ( 1 ) Is a New Departure in Federal 
Legislation 
We know of no federal law providing for specification by a 
government body of the procedures that professional practi-
tioners shall follow, the manner in which they shall follow them, 
the steps that they shall take in the performance of their profes-
sional work. Section 32 (c) (1) of Senate Bill 3580, which 
does provide for such dictation to professional certified public 
accountants, would be an innovation in federal legislation. 
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It would be manifestly absurd to engage an attorney to 
present a case, and then prescribe exactly what statutes and 
decisions he should study, what arguments he should include 
in his brief, and how he should present them in court. He 
must use his judgment, with due regard for his professional 
standing and integrity. It would be equally absurd to instruct 
an engineer just how to apply the techniques of his profession 
in the planning and supervision of the construction of a bridge, 
or to instruct a physician in treating a patient. It is no less 
futile to attempt to lay down a pattern in advance which all 
certified public accountants must follow in conducting inde-
pendent audits. 
It is a commonplace that responsibility should carry com-
mensurate authority. Certified public accountants bear heavy 
responsibilities. They risk their professional reputations every 
time they sign a report. They are subject to civil liabilities 
under the common law and under the Securities Acts. They 
are entitled to determine for themselves, without outside inter-
ference, what steps they will take in forming the opinions in 
the expression of which they incur these risks. 
The independent status of the professional certified public 
accountant is vitally important in the performance of his 
function. A principal reason for his engagement to conduct 
an audit is to secure an objective, disinterested review of the 
facts and the presentation of the company's affairs, which will 
fully disclose information of importance to all parties at 
interest. The independent auditor is "in the middle." He is 
a kind of umpire. It is his duty to reveal the truth as he sees 
it, not to present a report favorable to the wishes of man-
agement, of creditors, of a governmental regulatory agency, or 
of any other one group. If a governmental agency had power 
to prescribe the scope of his investigations and the procedures 
which he should follow, it would acquire control and influence 
over the accountant which might impair his objectivity. The 
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accountant might, to a degree at least, assume the status of 
an agent for the regulatory body. 
A. A. Berle, Jr., now Assistant Secretary of State, in an 
address before an accounting society, ascribed great importance 
to this point. He said ". . . your profession . . . hav-
ing freed itself from the chains of servitude to business-
men . . . may all too easily find itself merely the cipher-
ing agency for virtually unreviewable bureaucrats. It took time 
to teach merchants that they could not give orders to accoun-
tants as to what their figures should show; and the profession 
must never drop to the point where its members are in demand 
primarily because their opinions will change whenever a sub-
examiner, for reasons not put on the record, wishes a different 
arrangement of figures." 
Section 32 (c) (1) Would Be an Unwarranted and 
Unnecessary Invasion of a Field of Professional 
Practice 
Certified public accountants have achieved recognition as 
a profession in statutes, in the courts, and in the public mind. 
They have built strong state and national professional organ-
izations; they have developed technical standards of practice, 
have maintained and enforced rules of professional conduct, 
and have exercised disciplinary authority over their members. 
This development has been gradual over the years and is con-
tinuing. They welcome the opportunity to cooperate with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and other private and 
governmental agencies in further improvement of accounting 
and auditing and corporate financial reporting. 
It is offensive to the members of this profession to suggest 
that the work of developing its technical and professional 
standards should be taken from the hands of the profession 
itself and be assumed by a department of the Federal 
Government. 
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The effect of Section 32 (c) (1), if it were administered 
under the widest possible interpretation, would be to make 
the Securities and Exchange Commission practically a partner 
of the accountant in every audit engagement undertaken pur-
suant to the terms of Senate Bill 3580—a situation inconsistent 
with the basic concept of the practice of any profession. 
If the sponsors of the bill should argue that there is no 
intention of applying the provisions of Section 32 (c) (1) in 
any such extreme manner; that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission would administer it in a reasonable way with 
due respect for the considerations we have advanced, the reply 
must be that it is no defense of bad law to say that it will be 
well administered. We feel justified, therefore, in asking for 
the elimination of this objectionable provision from the bill 
itself. 
Any effort to prescribe by rules and regulations the mini-
mum scope of audit and procedure to be followed in all cases 
is foredoomed to failure, since every case is different from 
every other one. Mandate can never successfully be substituted 
for professional judgment. 
Respectfully submitted for 
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS 
JOHN K. MATHIESON, chairman 
SAMUEL J. BROAD 
T. COLEMAN ANDREWS 
VICTOR H. STEMPF 
HOMER N. SWEET 
C. OLIVER WELLINGTON 
Special Committee 
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